In this paper, we investigate whether a natural selection works for firm exit after a massive natural disaster. By using a unique data set of more than 84,000 firms after the Great Tohoku Earthquake, we examine the impact of firm efficiency on firm bankruptcy both inside and outside the earthquake-affected areas. We find that more efficient firms are less likely to go bankrupt both inside and outside the affected areas, which indicates the existence of the natural selection. However, we also find that firms located inside the earthquake-affected areas are less likely to go bankrupt than those located outside of the areas. We also apply the same methodology to the case of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and find qualitatively similar results.
Introduction
Natural disasters inflict serious damage to firms. They destroy firms' tangible assets such as buildings and equipment as well as human capital, and thereby deteriorate production capacity of the firms. These adverse impacts might sometimes be fatal and force the firms to close down their businesses.
An intriguing question concerning firm exit caused by natural disasters is how the selection works, or in other words, what characteristics the firms that natural disasters force to exit have. As for the impact of natural disasters on economic growth, empirical studies find mixed evidence, and some of them even report a positive impact. 1 As a possible mechanism behind the positive impact, some studies find that natural disasters might enhance productivity of the economy's corporate sector (Skidmore and Toya 2002, Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2008) . Such evidence suggests that a natural selection might work, where natural disasters force inefficient firms to exit. However, because the existing evidence is based on aggregate data, detailed mechanisms behind the impact of disasters are unclear, and no studies have examined the selection of firms after natural disasters based on micro-level data on firm exits. 2 A closely related question that is inseparably intertwined with the one above is how the selection in the wake of natural disasters differs from that in other, i.e., non-disaster, 1 For a survey see, for example, Noy and Vu (2010) and Loayza et al. (2012) , and references therein. 2 As for the impact of natural disasters on economies' corporate sector, some studies focus on the impact of natural disasters on firm recovery (Leiter et al. 2009 , De Mel et al. 2011 , Hosono, et al. 2012 . However, few studies have explicitly examined the impact on firm exit. To the best of our knowledge, there is one study that examines the impact of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake on firm exit (Cole et al. 2013 ). However, this paper does not investigate the impact of the Great Tohoku Earthquake, and does not put much emphasis on how the selection of firms worked.
environments. Since the early pioneering works such as Schumpeter (1939) , Alchian (1950), and Jovanovic (1982) , there has been long-standing literature that explores the mechanism through which the market eliminates inefficient firms, especially during the recession period (e.g., Bertin, et al. 1996 , Bresnahan and Raff 1991 , Caballero and Hammour 1994 . Evidence is also abundant in Japan. To clarify the factors that contributed to the Japan's so called "lost decades" from 1990s, many studies find evidence suggesting that banks suffering from a large amount of non-performing loans supported inefficient zombie firms to evergreen, and made the selection of firms unnatural (see, e.g., Kim 2004 , Ahearne and Shinada 2005 , Nishimura et al. 2005 Rosengren 2005, Fukao and Kwon 2006, Caballero et al. 2008) . 3 However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies, including those introduced thus far, have compared the selection of firms in disaster and non-disaster environments.
To answer the questions raised above, this paper examines whether the natural or unnatural selection works for firms in the aftermath of the devastating Great Tohoku Earthquake (also known as the Great East-Japan Earthquake) that hit the Tohoku area of Japan on March 11, 2011. 4 We use data of many small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the Tohoku area, which include information on firms' attributes, financial statements, their main banks, and the information on firms' exit after the earthquake.
We also use information on the location of firms' headquarters inside or outside the earthquake-affected areas to identify firms that were directly damaged by the earthquake.
In our analysis, we run a probit model regression for firm exit. Our dependent variable is an indicator for bankruptcy, one of the most important forms of firm exit. Our main independent variable is firms' credit score calculated by a credit research company, which is a good proxy for firm efficiency. We run the regressions for firms that are located inside and outside the affected areas, and compare how the selection works between firms that are directly damaged and those that are not.
From the regression results, we first find that the probability for firm bankruptcy is lower for more efficient firms both inside and outside the affected areas. This finding supports the hypothesis that a natural selection works, irrespective of the presence/absence of damage caused by the earthquake. Second, by comparing the firms inside and outside the affected areas, we find that the firms inside the areas are less likely to go bankrupt than those located outside. This finding indicates that damage from the earthquake decreased, not increased, firm exit. One possible reason for this decrease is public and private aids that have been provided to damaged firms or firms in the affected areas, such as the moratorium for delinquent payments introduced immediately after the quake.
Third, these findings are robust to the exclusion of sample firms in the areas affected by tsunami, where voluntary closures are more likely and the selection of firms may have worked differently.
To obtain more evidence on the firm selection after natural disasters, we also apply 6 our methodology to another devastating earthquake in Japan: the Great Hanshin
Earthquake that hit the areas around Kobe city and Awaji Island on January 17, 1995. By running similar probit model regressions, we again find that the natural selection works both inside and outside the affected areas, but that the bankruptcy probability is lower inside the affected areas. On balance, our findings suggest that the natural selection works for firms in Japan after the earthquake, but that public intervention supports damaged firms to survive.
The remaining part of this paper is composed of as follows. The next section details our empirical approach including data and the econometric model for estimation.
Section 3 reports our main results and the results for a robustness check. Section 4 is for the analysis of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and the final section concludes the paper.
Empirical approach

Data and sample selection
The main source of our data is firm-level credit files compiled by Teikoku Databank ltd.
(TDB), a leading private business credit bureau in Japan. Information on firms' attributes, financial statements, and their lending banks is available from the credit files.
From the TDB database, we first pick those firms whose headquarters are located in the six prefectures in the Tohoku area of Japan (Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, and Fukushima) at the time of the Great Tohoku Earthquake. The areas seriously damaged by the earthquake are located inside these prefectures, and therefore damaged as well as non-damaged firms are included in our sample. We exclude those firms that are located outside the Tohoku area to exclude heterogeneity in unobserved firm characteristics stemming from region-specific factors. The TDB database also contains information on whether or not the firms went bankrupt during the post-earthquake period from March 2011 to November 2012. The number of firms that were headquartered in the six prefectures, and for which we have information on firm bankruptcy, is 98,070.
We then eliminate firms for which any of the variables to be used in the regression analysis (which will be explained in details below) is not available, firms that belong to financial industries, and firms for which no industry information is available. This reduces the number of our sample firms to 84,012. These 84,012 firms are used for our analysis.
Regression and variables
Regression
We run a probit model regression of firm exit of the following form.
where yi*=Xi b+ei, Φ represents the cdf of the standard normal distribution, and i =1, ..., N is an indicator for each of the N sample firms. The variable Bankrupt is an indicator of firm bankruptcy.
The variable yi* is the latent variable to determine the probability of bankruptcy Pr[Bankrupti = 1], and the vector Xi indicates the independent variables to determine yi*.
The final term e i is an ordinary error term.
To alleviate problems caused by any endogeneity, we use the pre-earthquake value of the independent variables, except for the proxies for earthquake damage. More precisely, the variables from the financial statements are as of the end of the fiscal year 2010, i.e., March 31, 2011. 5 As for other variables, we use those in year 2010 (January to December 2010). Depending on the frequency of TDB's research on firms, information for some firms is available for multiple times (at multiple data points within 2010). In such cases,
we use the most recent data.
Main variables Bankruptcy and firm damage
Our dependent variable is an indicator of firm bankruptcy, Bankrupt. This is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm is defined by TDB as going bankrupt from March 2011 to November 2012 and zero otherwise. Although going bankrupt generically means that firms are unable to repay debt and deemed as insolvent, it is difficult to exactly define bankrupt firms. We thus follow the definition by TDB. 6 We focus on exit in the form of bankruptcy due to data availability, but bankruptcy is 9 not the only form of firm exit. Other forms of exit that are also commonly used in Japan are voluntary business closure, suspension of operations and dissolutions, which are not (at least directly) associated with default or insolvency. 7 Neglecting these forms of exit and focusing only on bankruptcy may not only underestimate the overall incidences of firm exit, but also result in biased estimation to the extent that voluntary business closures change the relationship between firm bankruptcy and efficiency. In our case, the bias may be serious if we include in the sample those firms that are located in the areas along the coast, because such firms were devastated by massive tsunami and were unable to report their status and/or to file for bankruptcies. In order to circumvent the possible bias caused by the inclusion of these tsunami areas, we implement an additional analysis by limiting our sample firms to those that escaped from damage by tsunami.
Another important variable is an indicator for firms damaged by the earthquake, F_DAMAGED. Because no information is available on direct damage that firms suffered from the earthquake, 8 To construct this variable, we identify whether firms' headquarters are located inside the earthquake-affected areas based on the most recent location information available before the earthquake. The affected areas are defined as cities and towns that were stipulated as areas heavily damaged by the earthquake in the Japanese Government's Act Concerning Special Financial Support to Deal with a Designated Disaster of Extreme Severity, which includes areas affected by the tsunamis and by the 7 To be more precise, being acquired by other firms in mergers and acquisitions is another form of firms exit. 8 We cannot identify firm damage using financial statement information because the balance sheet information on physical capital stock is of book values, and few firms record special losses due to the earthquake.
nuclear plant accident in Fukushima prefecture. The firm damage variable F_DAMAGED takes a value of one if the firms' headquarters are located inside these affected areas and zero otherwise. 9 Table 1 shows the breakdown of our sample firms depending on whether Bankrupt = 0 or 1 and whether F_DAMAGED = 0 or 1. Row (a) of this table shows the numbers of observations in our main sample that will be used for the regression analyses. As shown in column (1), we have 400 firms that are recorded as bankrupt firms in our sample, which account for 0.476% of the sample. Columns (2) and (3) We observe that the rate of bankruptcy is slightly higher for firms in the non-affected area (0.516%: column (2)) than in the affected area (0.405%: column (3)). As shown in column (4), the difference in the bankruptcy rates is statistically significant. This suggests that the earthquake reduced the probability of firm bankruptcy by a significant margin. Note, however, that this finding might just be an artifact of the difference in the characteristics of firms inside and outside the affected areas. Also we are not yet sure whether the probability of bankruptcy differs depending on firm efficiency.
For reference, we also report in row (b) the same numbers of firms when we use an expanded sample for which we have information on Bankrupt and F_DAMAGED (and do not necessarily have all the information on other regression variables). The bankruptcy probabilities in row (b) are quite similar to those in the row (a), indicating that the elimination of sample firms due to missing variables does not cause serious bias.
Efficiency
The main empirical question of this paper is whether the selection of firms is natural or unnatural, i.e., whether or not inefficient firms are more likely to go bankrupt. Many existing studies on the firm selection use firms' total factor productivity (TFP) as a measure of firm efficiency. However, even a crude measure of TFP requires financial statement data of the firms. In our data set, the number of observations with financial statement data is very small, especially for firms located inside the affected area. We thus decide not to use TFP measures.
Instead, we use firms' score, F_SCORE, that TDB calculates as a proxy for firm efficiency. The score takes an integer value on a 1-100 scale, and evaluates the soundness of the firm's management, its repayment ability, and its creditworthiness as a safe trade counterpart, from a third-party's viewpoint. The score for a firm is calculated as the sum of subscores for seven different elements: business history (its maximum score is 5), capital structure (12), firm size (19), profitability (10), funding capacity (20), CEO's ability (15), and firms' future growth potential (19). These elements are based not only on financial statement information but also on qualitative information on managerial efficiencies. This score is calculated on an unsolicited basis, i.e., the firms do not pay for being rated. 10
In Table 2 , we report the descriptive statistics for F_SCORE on its first row. The mean firm score (F_SCORE) is 45.3. The scores for damaged and non-damaged firms are around 45 and economically comparable, although the test statistic shows that the mean score for damaged firm is significantly smaller than that for non-damaged ones.
Control variables
We also use many control variables to isolate the impact of the main variables on firm bankruptcy. The definition and the descriptive statistics of these variables are shown in the remaining part of Table 2 , where the statistics are also compared depending on whether the firms are damaged or not by the earthquake. First, we use variables that represent firm characteristics. We use three such variables: F_EMP, the number of employees (firm size); F_AGE, the age of the firm; and F_NBANK, the number of banks that the firm transacts with. We also use industry dummies. 11 Table 2 shows that the sample firms on average have 13 employees, are 30 years old, and transact with two banks.
Second, we use variables that represent characteristics of the main banks of our sample firms. 12 Three of the variables are based on financial statement information:
10 TDB does not regard the score as a measure of the probabilities of default (pd). B_ROA, ROA of the main bank defined as ordinary profit over total asset; B_CAP, capital asset ratio (book value) of the main bank; and B_lnASSET, the natural logarithm of the main bank's total asset (bank size). We also use dummy variables to indicate the type of the main banks: B_REGIONAL for regional banks that are medium-sized banks whose banking operations are regionally focused; B_REGIONAL2 for second-tier regional banks that also operate regionally but they tend to be smaller in size; B_SHINKIN for Shinkin banks that are cooperative banks specializing in providing commercial banking services to member SMEs and individuals; with city banks (largest banks operating nationwide) and trust banks (large banks that can also offer trust services) being the default. 13 Table 3 shows our main results. In this table, we not only report the result for the entire sample but also the results for subsamples. Among the four panels of Table 3 is for the sample with F_DAMAGED = 0. For each panel, the marginal effects of the respective variables are shown in the "dF/dx" column together with the probability values in the "p-value" column. Probability values are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 14 13 For different types of banks in Japan, see Uchida and Udell (2010) . 14 We do not introduce an interaction term between F_DAMAGED and F_SCORE to the specification of Panel (B) due to a possible multicollinearity problem between F_DAMAGED*F_SCORE and F_SCORE, whose correlation coefficient is 0.9859. Instead, we split Looking first at the marginal effects of control variables in Panels (A) and (B), the probability of firm bankruptcy is higher for larger firms (F_EMP), for older firms (F_AGE),
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for firms transacting with a larger number of banks (F_NBANK), and for firms transacting with less profitable (B_ROA) and less capitalized (B_CAP) banks. The sign of marginal effect on the bank capital variable is consistent with the findings in previous studies on capital crunch, which reveal that less capitalized banks shrink lending to meet the regulatory capital requirement (e.g., Peek and Rosengren 1995) . Second, the results for subsamples in Panels (C) and (D) show that the signs of marginal effects on the variables explained above are almost the same as the results for the whole sample, except for the statistically insignificant marginal effect of F_EMP, F_AGE, and B_ROA in Panel (C).
We also find in Panels (C) and (D) that other variables are also statistically significant.
The variable of our primary interest is the firms' score (F_SCORE). The baseline result in Panel (A) shows that it has a negative and statistically significant coefficient.
This means that firms with higher scores are less likely to go bankrupt. This finding is consistent with the natural selection. The magnitude of the coefficient in Panel (A) means that for an average firm, one-point increase in F_SCORE reduces the probability of bankruptcy by 0.043 percentage points. This finding means a 0.250 percentage point decrease in the bankruptcy probability for a one-standard deviation increase in F_SCORE (which is 5.81: see Table 2 ). Because the average bankruptcy rate is 0.476% as shown in Table 1 , the effect of F_SCORE on the bankruptcy probability is economically significant.
the whole sample by F_DAMAGED, estimate parameters separately, and show the results in Panels (C) and (D) in order to see the effect of F_SCORE on the bankruptcy probability for damaged and undamaged firms.
To examine how the earthquake affects the selection of firms, we need to compare the bankruptcy probability inside and outside the affected areas. In this vein, in Panel (B) we add a dummy variable F_DAMAGED as an additional independent variable. We find that the marginal effect of F_DAMAGED is negative and significant. This finding is consistent with the univariate result shown in column (4) of Table 1 . The coefficient estimate
indicates that the probability of bankruptcy in the quake-affected area is lower by 0.100
percentage points as compared with the probability outside the area.
The finding of the smaller bankruptcy probability of firms in the affected area might seem counter-intuitive. However, it should be noted that enormous amount of public and private aids were provided to firms in the affected area after the devastating earthquake.
Public aids that were provided include a moratorium for delinquent payments, subsidies for reconstruction of damaged facilities, corporate tax reduction, government loans, and a special credit guarantee program. These measures might have contributed to the recovery of damaged firms and to the smaller number of firm bankruptcies in the affected areas.
To compare the selection of firms inside and outside the affected areas, we need to compare the effect of F_SCORE inside and outside the areas. We thus split our sample depending on the value of F_DAMAGED and run the same regressions. 15 Panels (C) and (D) show the results for the coefficients on F_SCORE for different subsamples. We find in these panels that the marginal effect coefficient on F_SCORE is not only negative and significant in both panels but also they are quantitatively very similar. The coefficients indicate that for an average firm, one-point increase in F_SCORE reduces the probability of firm bankruptcy by 0.039 percentage points for those that were damaged and by 0.040
percentage points for those that were undamaged.
Discussion and interpretations
To comprehend the economic significance of the results we have obtained, this subsection provides an illustrative description of the overall effects of firm efficiency on the bankruptcy probability. Using the estimates for their coefficients for our main variables together with those for the other variables shown in Table 3 , we illustrate the difference in the impact of firm efficiency between damaged and undamaged firms. 
Robustness check
As explained in Section 2.2.2, due to data availability, we have focused solely on one form of firm exit, i.e., bankruptcies, and ignored other forms of firm exit such as voluntary closure, suspension of operations, or dissolutions. However, ignoring other forms of exit may bias our analysis to the extent that these other forms of firm exit change the relationship between bankruptcy and firm attributes. The bias may be in particular serious if we include the areas where firms are more likely to voluntarily close their businesses after the earthquake. This is likely to be the case in the areas along the coast of the quake-affected areas, because massive tsunami devastated the areas and had many firms unable to report their status and/or to file for bankruptcies. In order to circumvent a possible bias caused by the inclusion of such firms, we implement additional analysis by limiting our sample firms to those that did not suffer from damage by tsunami.
Among the 84,012 sample firms in the main analysis, there were 4,602 of them whose headquarters were located in areas inundated by the tsunamis caused by the Great Tohoku Earthquake. Among these firms, 17 firms went bankrupt during our sample period and so the ratio of bankruptcies is 0.37% in the tsunami area, which is smaller than the bankruptcy ratio for rest of the Tohoku area, 0.49%. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many firms that had their buildings and equipment swept away by the tsunami have suspended their operations ever since, which may be the reason for the smaller-than average rate of bankruptcies in the area. Table 4 shows our estimation results excluding the firms that were located in the tsunami area. The format of this table is the same as that of Table 3: The results are qualitatively the same with those in Table 3 . The bankruptcy ratio is lower for damaged firms than for undamaged firms, and the marginal effects for firm efficiency variable F_SCORE are negative and statistically significant, and their levels are comparable. Overall, even after excluding the area inundated by the tsunami, we find that the selection mechanism is natural, and that the bankruptcy probability is lower in the affected areas.
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
To obtain more evidence on the firm selection after natural disasters, we apply the same methodology to the case of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake that hit the areas around Kobe city and Awaji Island of Japan on January 17, 1995, 16 years before the Great Tohoku Earthquake. 16 Before the Great Tohoku Earthquake, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake had been considered as an "unprecedented" disaster that would happen only once in one hundred years.
There are many differences between the two earthquakes. Compared with the Great Tohoku Earthquake, the affected areas of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake are far concentrated, mostly in urban areas. The latter did not accompany tsunamis, but instead inflicted many casualties by fires it broke out. However, both earthquakes brought about massive damages not only to human beings but also to firms in the affected areas. Thus, by comparing the findings between the two earthquakes, we might be able to draw more information on how the selection works.
Data and Methodology
We use data from the same sources (the TDB database) and the same empirical model (probit model of firm bankruptcy) as those in previous sections. From the database, we choose firms that were headquartered in Hyogo prefecture (whose capital is Kobe city) and its adjacent Osaka prefecture at the time of the earthquake. The damage was concentrated in a specific area around Kobe and in a small part of Osaka, and we can consider firms located outside these areas as adequate control firms that have similar region-specific characteristics. We define the affected area as the towns and the cities in the two prefectures that were included in the Japanese Government's Act Concerning Special Financial Support to Deal with a Designated Disaster of Extreme Severity. As in the case of the Great Tohoku Earthquake, the indicator variable F_DAMAGED takes the value of one if the firm was located in this affected area and zero otherwise.
Because the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake took place 16 years before the Great Tohoku Earthquake, the period during which we can collect bankruptcy data is much longer than the one for the recent Great Tohoku Earthquake (1 year and 8 months period: see section 2.1). Thus we take the three year window after the earthquake (January 1995 to December 1997) and define the bankruptcy dummy, but to distinguish from the variable for the Great Tohoku Earthquake, we label the variable Bankrupt3. We adopt the three year window because it is hard to imagine that the effect of the earthquake lasts more than three years, and for the purpose of eliminating the effect of the banking crisis in the late 1990s. 17 Table 5 shows the breakdown of our sample firms depending on the value of the bankruptcy dummy (rows) and F_DAMAGED (columns). A set of upper rows (A) reports the numbers of bankrupt and surviving firms based on Bankrupt3 (three year window).
For information we also report in the remaining set of rows (B) the numbers of bankrupt and surviving firms based on Bankrupt (1 year and 8 months window). Similar to Table 1, we also report the numbers of the firms for the regression sample (row (a) (4) we find that the bankruptcy rate is higher for firms located outside the affected area than those located inside, which is consistent with the finding in Table 1 for the Great Tohoku Earthquake.
However, due to the smaller sample, the difference is statistically less significant when we use the regression sample. Compared with Table 1 , we find that the ratio of bankrupt firms is higher on average. The bankruptcy rate for the whole regression sample was 0.476% in Table 1 , but it is 2.781% in this table (row (A)-(a) of column (1)). Even if we take the same length of the window period, the bankruptcy rate is 1.046% (row (B)-(a) of column (1)).
The list of the independent variables of the regression analysis is shown in Table 6 together with their summary statistics. Similar to for F_SCORE, we use ROA of the firm, F_ROA, which is defined as the ratio of net current profit to total asset as a proxy for firm efficiency. Another difference is the inclusion of a new bank type dummy, B_COOPERATIVE, which takes the value of one if the firm's main bank is a credit cooperative. There were no firms in the regression sample for the Great Tohoku Earthquake, whose main banks are credit cooperatives, but there are some in this regression sample for the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Similar to the analysis on the Great Tohoku Earthquake, to circumvent any endogeneity we use the most recent values of the independent variables that are available during the past one year of the earthquake except for variables that indicate earthquake damage. Table 7 reports the results for the probit model regression of firm bankruptcy. The format of the table is the same as the one of Table 3 On the control variables, there are several differences from the results for the Great Tohoku Earthquake. For example, signs of the coefficients on F_AGE and F_EMP are opposite to those obtained for the Great Tohoku Earthquake in Table 3 and the coefficient for B_CAP is not statistically significant as opposed to the negative and significant coefficient in the case of the Tohoku Earthquake.
Results
As for the variable of our primary interest, firms' efficiency measure (F_ROA), its marginal effect is positive and significant in all panels from (A) to (D). This means that 18 To compare the results with the ones for the Great Tohoku Earthquake we report the results when the sample is split depending on the value of F_DAMAGED. In the case of this sample for the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, however, the collinearity problem between F_DAMAGED*F_ROA and F_ROA is not severe because the correlation coefficient is 0.0475. efficient firms with higher ROAs are less likely to go bankrupt, which is consistent with the results for the Great Tohoku Earthquake in Table 3 . This finding serves as evidence for the natural selection after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.
We also find that the coefficient for F_DAMAGED is significant with a negative sign.
This indicates that firms in the affected area, which are highly likely to be damaged firms, are less likely to go bankrupt. This finding is again consistent with our finding for the Great Tohoku Earthquake in Table 3 . Public and private aids might have contributed to the survival of firms in the affected area.
Discussion and interpretations
As we did in Figure 1 , to understand the economic significance of the results in Table 7, we provide in Figure 2 Earthquake is mostly consistent with those in the case of the Great Tohoku Earthquake because we find the natural selection both inside and outside the affected areas and the lower bankruptcy probability inside the area. The only exception is the smaller slope (or the marginal effect) of F_ROA on the bankruptcy probability, which means that in the case of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the natural selection is more intensive outside the affected area.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the selection of firms using a large sample of firms located inside and outside the affected areas of the Great Tohoku Earthquake. We found smaller bankruptcy probabilities for firms with higher credit scores, which suggests the presence of the natural selection. However, we also found that the bankruptcy probability is lower for firms located inside the earthquake-affected area. We also applied the same empirical methodology to the case of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake to find qualitatively similar results.
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For the purpose of clarifying the detailed mechanisms behind the impact of natural disasters on economic growth, our finding has an important implication. Our findings imply that although the two great earthquakes did not change firms' natural selection, they did decrease the overall bankruptcy probability. The former finding implies that the earthquakes had a neutral effect on the growth of the economy. However, the latter finding implies that the disasters had a negative impact on the overall growth, since there is a smaller number of inefficient firms going out of business and a smaller increase in the share of efficient firms in the economy.
Some studies have argued that natural disasters can improve the productivity of the corporate sector by forcing out inefficient firms while keeping efficient ones in the market.
Our findings cast doubt on this simplistic story. However, we are not yet complete in clarifying the mechanisms through which natural disasters affect the productivity of the corporate sector. In addition to clarifying the effect of natural disasters on firm exit, we need to examine the impacts of natural disasters on other aspects of firm dynamics, including the effects on firm recovery, on the productivity of surviving firms, and on startups, which are all important research agenda for future studies. Bankrupt is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the firm is recorded as bankrupt after the earthquake. F_DAMAGED is a proxy for firm damage that is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the firm is located in one of the cities or towns identified as affected by the earthquake in the Act on Special Financial Support to Deal with a Designated Disaster of Extreme Severity. 
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